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Abstract 
This article focuses on governmental control over state broadcasting media in 
Greece and analyses whether Hellenic Broadcasting Corporation can be 
considered as public or state broadcaster. The first part explores the 
interrelationship between media, politics and the state in Greece, and the ways 
the latter has affected the development of Hellenic Broadcasting Corporation. By 
doing so, it makes references to similar Southern European broadcasting models 
that are also characterised by clientist manners, ministerial censorship, a powerful 
state and a weak civil society. Furthermore, it looks at the devastating impact of 
haphazard deregulation and market liberalisation on Hellenic Broadcasting 
Corporation since the early 1990s, when the Hellenic Broadcasting Corporation 
lost much of its formerly loyal audience and advertising income to a number of 
newly launched commercial television channels. Part 2 assesses the degree of 
political, editorial and financial independence of Hellenic Broadcasting 
Corporation under the current SYRIZA-led administration. Hellenic Broadcasting 
Corporation was re-launched by the left-wing SYRIZA government after a 
temporary 2-year closure, but it is struggling to maintain a competitive advantage 
and a politically neutral output. 
 
Keywords Greece, Hellenic Broadcasting Corporation, media, politics, public service 
broadcasting, state broadcasting 
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Introduction 
Most media systems in general, and public broadcasting systems in particular are to some degree subject 
to political power, and disputes over the independence of public broadcasting are common to the history 
of European media. In effect, most southern European public broadcasting systems have been to a 
certain extent subject to political influence and dependence. In the case of Greece, Hellenic 
Broadcasting Corporation (ERT) even nowadays after four decades of the breakup of its broadcasting 
monopoly is still labelled by many as ‘state’ rather than ‘public’ broadcaster. This wide public 
perception stems from ERT’s one-time role as a mouthpiece of government propaganda and its on-
going close relationship with the government of the day. As both radio and TV broadcasting were 
launched under dictatorships, they have been regarded as ‘arms of the state.’ Post-dictatorship politics 
and the restoration of Parliament in 1974 witnessed the Conservatives (New Democracy) and Socialists 
(PASOK) dominating the political scene accusing each other of too much governmental control over 
state broadcasting media. Even the new ERT, re-launched by the current left-wing SYRIZA government 
after a temporary two-year closure, is criticised from opposition parties and the press, accusing the 
broadcaster of promoting the government’s positions. ERT never obtained a reputation for investigative 
reporting, but some political voices and mainstream media argue that today has a fundamental bias 
towards SYRIZA, the party in power. 
This article focuses on governmental control over state broadcasting media and analyses 
whether ERT can be considered as public or state broadcaster. The first part explores the 
interrelationship between media, politics and the state in Greece, and the ways the latter has affected 
the development of ERT. By doing so it makes references to similar Southern European broadcasting 
models that are also characterised by clientist manners, ministerial censorship, a powerful state and a 
weak civil society. Further, it looks at the devastating impact of haphazard deregulation and market 
liberalization on ERT since the early 1990s, when the Hellenic Broadcasting Corporation lost much of 
its formerly loyal audience and advertising income to a number of newly launched commercial 
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television channels. Part two assesses the degree of political, editorial and financial independence of 
ERT under the current SYRIZA-led administration. ERT was re-launched by the left-wing SYRIZA 
government after a temporary two-year closure, but it is struggling to maintain a competitive advantage 
and a politically neutral output. 
 
Part One 
 
The powerful Greek state 
The symbiotic relationship that broadcasting and politics present in Greece is closely linked to political 
upheavals of the country - both radio and television broadcasting were introduced under dictatorships 
in modern Greece's troubled history. Radio was formed in the late 1930s under the Metaxas dictatorship 
and television in the mid-1960s under the Colonels (1967-74). Consequently, both radio and television 
have been regarded as ‘arms of the state.’ Moreover, the whole debate about the electronic state media 
in Greece before deregulation of the sector was focused on governmental control and interference in 
television programmes. This has become part of post-dictatorship ritualised politics and since 
Parliament was re-established in 1974, the Conservatives and Socialists have dominated the political 
scene accusing each other of too much governmental control over state broadcasting media 
(Papathanassopoulos, 1999). 
This situation has largely arisen from the political tensions in Greek society since the Second 
World War. These tensions, combined with the absence of a strong civil society, have made the state 
an autonomous and dominant factor in Greek society. For example, shortly after the end of World War 
II, Greece endured a Civil War between supporters of the government that was in exile during the war 
and returned to Greece after liberation from the Germans, and the Communist Party in Greece. The civil 
war led to deep political polarisation and was widely regarded as a missed opportunity to establish a 
civil society organisation that would work for democracy, equality, consensus and culture beyond the 
nation-state (Christodoulakis, 2016). The political instability and the dictatorship (1967-74) that 
followed saw Greek people’s civil liberties vanishing. Greek democracy was only cemented in 1974 
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with the abolition of the colonels’ regime and further strengthened in 1981 with Greece’s European 
Union membership. 
These developments, even from the inauguration of modern Greece, have turned the Greek state 
to become not only relatively autonomous but to also perform an ‘over-extended’ character. In tandem, 
some Greek commentators like Mouzelis (1980: 261-4) point out that these conditions have been 
associated with a weak, atrophied civil society where the state has to take on additional politico-
ideological function. This makes the system less self-regulatory than nations with developed capitalism 
such as exists in Western European countries like Britain or in the US. Thus, the state has to intervene 
and adopt a dirigist attitude because it has to 'fill the gaps' in various sectors of the society and economy. 
Mouzelis (1980: 263) notes that because of the persistence of patronage politics, even bourgeois parties 
and interest groups are articulated within the state machinery in a clientist/personalistic manner.  
In economic terms, the central accumulation of revenues in the Greek state made necessary 
government intervention in planning, financing and management of economic development 
(Christodoulakis, 2016). The state with the ‘power of the purse’ has the ability to create, buy-off or 
maintain political coalitions. As Houliaras and Sotiropoulos (2018) contend, those in charge of the state 
have the power to create client groups eh nihilo in order to help keep themselves in power. Thus, the 
political dynamics of state-society interaction become rudimentary, one-sided and usually lacking in 
real-content. Spanou and Sotiropoulos (2011) mentioned that over-regulation and legalism have 
dominated state-economy relations, while after 1974 in the public sector necessary democratisation was 
limited to the granting of new rights to civil servants and establishing new political institutions, such as 
independent regulatory authorities. The state was more accessible to citizens but never became more 
efficient. In other words, institutional reform prevailed over managerial reform. But in the case of media 
even the creation of independent bodies has been proved problematic, since the broadcasting regulator 
ESR (set up by law 2863/2000) has never gained a reputation of being financially and politically 
independent. Meanwhile, organised interests, such as networks of business enterprises in the 
construction and media sectors, the liberal professions and insiders of the labour market, such as 
employees of state-owned enterprises, focused on rent seeking, competing for resources and subsidies 
(Houliaras and Sotiropoulos, 2018). 
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Media, politics and clientelism 
The   interrelationship between media and politics has affected the development of the news media in 
many ways (Hallin and Mancini, 2004). First, it has encouraged the uses of the news media for other 
purposes than the balanced provision of news stories. The politicisation of business is a result not only 
of the important role the state plays in the economy, but also of the nature of the political process. ‘What 
was important for an interest group’, write Lanza and Lavdas (2000: 207) referring to Greece and Italy, 
‘was its ability to establish a special and privileged bond with a party, a sector in the public 
administration, a branch of the executive, a politician or a civil servant. In this way, institutions became 
permeable; otherwise they remained totally impermeable’. In Italy, the public broadcaster, RAI, was 
essentially under the control of the ruling Christian Democratic Party in the 1950s and 1960s, but in the 
1970s, when a broader coalition was formed and the ‘historic compromise’ allowed the Partido 
Communista to share in the lottizzazione – the division of political power and benefits – control of RAI 
was divided among the parties, with the Christian Democrats retaining control of one channel, the 
‘secular parties’ the second and the Communists the third. In recent years the board of directors of RAI 
has been reduced in size, making proportional representation impossible, and a move which may require 
a degree of de-politicisation of appointments to the board (Hallin and Papathanassopoulos, 2000).   
With reference to the French context, Kuhn (2010) writes that the claims of public broadcasters 
to public service status have to be qualified by their long historical association with the political 
executive that has often negatively impacted on their capacity to provide independent and balanced 
news. In Malta, the state, the political parties, the Church and the university own radio and TV stations, 
thereby confirming the strong presence of institutions, especially political parties, in the broadcasting 
scene (Borg, 2007: 254). Spain is another country in Southern Europe in which the ruling party directly 
used to control the public broadcaster (Bergers, 2017). As a consequence of the close connection 
between Spanish political elites and the public broadcaster, Leon (2010) contends that the output of the 
Spanish public television offerings cannot contribute to the fulfilment of its public service role. 
Similarly, Portugal has had a public broadcasting system in which the government majority has 
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effective control, thereby leaving little room for editorial autonomy (Costa e Silva and Sousa, 2017; 
Mancini, 2000; Papathanassopoulos, 2007). 
The concept of clientelism is useful in media analysis because it explains normative issues of 
media performance in a democratic system. Clientelistic relationships coexist in a complex relationship 
with other forms of political organization (Hallin and Papathanassopoulos, 2000). Their centrality 
varies, for they are most central in Greece and Italy, where the political parties are tied relatively closely 
to the party system and less developed in Malta, where there is a more active civil society.  
In northern Europe, clientelist relationships have been displaced to a large extent by rational-
legal forms of authority and, especially in the smaller continental European countries, by democratic 
corporatist politics, both of which decrease the need for economic elites to exert particularistic pressures 
and form partisan alliances (Hallin and Papathanassopoulos, 2000; Hallin and Mancini, 2004). In 
countries with a history of clientelism, such as Greece, Italy and some other southern European 
territories, rational-legal authority is less strongly developed. The judiciary and administrative 
apparatus are more party-politicised and there is often a tradition of evasion of the law. The persistence 
of a culture in which evasion of the law is relatively common means that opportunities for particularistic 
pressures are evident: governments can exercise pressure by enforcing the law selectively, and news 
media can do so by threatening selectively to expose wrongdoing. Legal proceedings against media 
owners are thus fairly common in many southern European countries (Papathanassopoulos, 2007). 
This situation has also affected the content of the media as means of negotiation among 
conflicting elites rather than means for the information of the public. Looking at the mass 
communication sector in general, the strong state in its role as a rule-maker defines the extent of the 
relative autonomy it is willing to grant to the media. Even in the case of the press, which enjoys a liberal 
regime, the state defines press autonomy. This can easily be seen in the press laws or in cases of declared 
national emergency where the state reserves the right to reduce press autonomy. In a more indirect but 
equally effective way, the state acts to enforce these formal rules, as well as to implement the unwritten 
rules of power politics, by using a wide range of means of intervention that are at its disposal. A very 
effective means that the state uses to enforce written press limits is to provide sizeable financial aid to 
the press, on which individual enterprises become dependent if they cannot cover their production costs. 
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Since entrepreneurs in public construction projects were also active in the media field, they cross-
subsidise their media outlets from revenues made out of public orders (Leandros, 2010). Other means 
that are rarely used are Courts, censorship, and suspension of publication. A recent effective way in 
financially-troubled Greece was a kind of financial aid though bank loaning under the ‘auspices’ of the 
government. In most of the cases the media owners could not pay off their loans.  
 
Media and the state in Greece 
In Greece, the deregulation of radio took place in 1987, followed closely by the deregulation of 
television in late 1989. As in other Southern European countries, the imminent deregulation of Greek 
broadcasting was associated with partisan ends, and eventually led by a haphazard reaction of politics 
(rather than a coherent plan), thus resulting in an overcrowded broadcasting scene. In November 1989, 
the first private channel called Mega Channel entered the Greek television landscape (now closed), and 
a month later a second channel by the name of Antenna TV followed. Since then, a plethora of national, 
regional and local television channels have sprung up all over the country without, however, an official 
license to broadcast. Ιn 2018 there were nine national private TV channels, three state channels, 65 
regional and 45 local TV channels (ESR, 2018). From their launch private channels have dominated the 
television sector in terms of audience ratings and advertising expenditure, affecting negatively ERT 
(see next section). The Greek media are primarily characterised by excess in supply over demand. This 
oversupply is explained by the fact that numerous print and broadcasting media outlets have to compete 
for a small-country audience and advertising market share.  
In the case of broadcasting, as noted, the state not only intervenes but is the active agent. Greek 
broadcasting was established, as in most European countries, as a state monopoly which remained after 
the restoration of Parliament. According to the Constitution of 1975, ‘radio and television will be under 
the direct control of the state’ (Dagtoglou, 1989). Although ‘direct control’ did not necessarily mean 
‘state monopoly’, state monopoly was justified on the grounds of limited frequencies being available, 
as well as the need to provide full coverage for such a mountainous country with its many islands. 
Therefore, the state became the sole agent of the broadcast media. The government manipulation of 
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state TV news output is a suitable example of the dirigist role of the state, since it has traditionally 
reflected and reinforced government views and policies (Papathanassopoulos, 2007). 
As a result, ministerial censorship was common practice and state control greater than was usual 
elsewhere. The general pattern of the Greek state broadcasting media was (and still is) that a transfer of 
political power will be followed by an equivalent changeover in the state media institutions' executives. 
The outcome, especially in the past, was news and editorial judgments of particular importance in close 
agreement, if not identical, to the government announcements on a whole range of policies.  
 In the era of the dominance of private television such a practice is rather absurd. However, the 
political affiliation of the executives of the Hellenic Broadcasting Corporation is self-evident as all 
parties in the Opposition still accuse the government of the day-to-day control of the news output. In 
this sense, it could be said that Public Service Broadcasting (PSB) never really existed in Greece. The 
main difference between a state broadcaster and a PSB is that the former does not enjoy editorial, 
political and financial independence and it often focuses on pure entertainment, while the latter has a 
public interest focus (Iosifidis 2017; Banerjee and Seneviratne 2005: 12). The troubled political history 
of the country formed a state rather than a public broadcaster. To understand this, one has to note that 
the license fee is not collected directly from the TV households, but from the very beginning though 
the electricity bills. In effect, there was never a license fee in a Western way. By and large, in Greece 
ERT was unable to function according to the public service regulations compared with those in Britain, 
Scandinavia or other northern European countries. As Hallin and Mancini (2004: 106-7) note ‘it is 
probably significant that democracy was restored ... at a time when the welfare state was on the 
defensive in Europe, and global forces of neoliberalism were strong’. In other words, the deregulatory 
deluge of the 1980s found ERT unprepared and weak.  
The ongoing financial crisis in Greece and the imposition of austerity measures by the so-called 
Troika (European Commission, International Monetary Fund and European Central Bank), apparently 
aiming at restoring the Greek economy, has in fact deepen Greek woes and brought major losses of 
advertising income for the media industry. Advertising expenditure from 2007 (just before Greece 
entered the financial crisis) to 2015 has fallen dramatically from €1.8 billion to €685 million in 2015, 
according to data provided by Tempo/Media Services (2018), representing a decrease of 62 per cent. 
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However, from 2015 to 2018 there has been an increase from 685 million in 2015 to 789 million 
(estimate) in 2018, representing an increase at about 15 per cent. In the period, however, between 2007 
to 2018 the advertising expenditure in Greece was decreased by 56.5 per cent. All media outlets are 
facing their most difficult period ever, though it is private TV channels and the print media (newspapers 
and magazines) that have suffered the most as the former dominate the advertising market (€473 
million, or more than 61 per cent of the total advertising expenditure) followed by the print media at 
around €135 million. Alongside advertising (and sales, in the case of print) losses, the traditional media 
face competition from new media services (broadband and digital media) brought about by 
developments in new technology. As elsewhere, this puts the media landscape in a consistent state of 
flux that requires rapid, direct decisions and initiatives from media companies. However, the ‘get-rich-
quick mentality’ among Greek business entrepreneurs, their risk-averse stance, as well as their attitude 
to spend their energy in seeking political protection rather than in initiating new activities (Huliaras and 
Sotiropoulos, 2018), are among the factors that played a significant role in shaping the deregulated 
media ecology and continue to plague Greece. 
 
Part Two 
 
The closing down of ERT  
ERT’s history is identified with the history of Greek broadcasting, but the emergence of private stations 
has been disastrous for the Hellenic Broadcasting Corporation. ERT has sharply declined in ratings and 
advertising revenues. In effect, all ERT's three channels have witnessed a steady erosion of market share 
since private TV launched in 1989 (see Graph 1). ERT’s management and the government realised that 
the broadcaster could no longer justify its presence in the system. ERT was too bureaucratic, with an 
uncompetitive output, and was labelled ‘mouthpiece of the government’. Amidst great difficulties, some 
of which are typical of PSBs in other, particularly southern EU countries (increased competition, 
decreased legitimacy, technological challenges), whereas others are related to the specific problems 
facing public broadcasting in Greece (frequent changes of leadership, concentration of media and 
political power in the hands of the Head of Government), ERT has been unable to maintain its 
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‘institutional credibility.’ Moreover, since market deregulation in 1989 politicians had been unable or 
reluctant to approve any of the three main plans (in 1989, 1997 and 2013) for the broadcaster’s salvation.  
Many voices called for a major restructuring of ERT to make it more trustful, less bureaucratic 
and more independent from the government, but instead of restructuring the then coalition government 
decided to close it down. On Tuesday, 11 June 2013, the screen of ERT went black. In effect, it was 
practically silenced overnight. The radio stations of the Greek public broadcaster had already been 
seized for a few hours. The conservative-led coalition government of Prime Minister Samaras had a 
few hours earlier announced its decision to close down and to subsequently restructure the Greek public 
broadcasting corporation ERT ‘on the right track’. 
ERT’s shutting down by the government provoked negative reaction among oppositional 
parties, trade unions and international bodies. The Opposition, led by the SYRIZA party, claimed that 
the government had fired ERT’s 2500 employees in order to prove to Greece’s international lenders 
(Troika) that it was serious about cutting the country’s bloated public sector (4000 jobs to go by the end 
of 2013). Moreover, the European Parliament, the Council of Europe, the European Broadcasting Union 
(EBU), press associations as well as more than 50 Directors General of European Public Broadcasters, 
including the BBC, ARD, ZDF, RΑΙ, RTVE, RTBF and France Télévisions, reacted to this decision 
condemning the Greek government’s ‘undemocratic and unprofessional’ course of action, which 
‘undermines the existence of public service media in Greece’ (EBU, 2013). The legality of ERT’s 
closure under the lens of, first, European Union (EU) Law, and secondly, the European Convention of 
Human Rights (ECHR) has also been addressed. Iosifidis and Katsirea (2015) contended that the Greek 
government’s sudden move to shut down ERT was not designed as a reform measure and the argument 
that Greece acted strictly in implementation of EU law appears precipitate, especially given that the 
1997 Amsterdam Protocol recognises the importance of PSB for the democratic, social and cultural 
needs of each society. 
In considering whether ERT’s closure violated Art. 10 ECHR, the above commentators 
established in an earlier work that there has been an interference with freedom of expression, first, of 
the employees working at ERT who had a right to impart information and ideas and, secondly, of the 
viewing public who had a right to receive ERT’s programmes. Further, the closure of a PSB on the 
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basis of purely financial considerations is in any case, in the authors’ view, not allowed under Art. 10 
(2) ECHR, for the only legitimate objective that could come into question is the protection of rights of 
others. Iosifidis and Katsirea (2014: 14) concluded that ‘if the government’s intention was to clean the 
“Augean stables” in a single day, then surely this could have better been achieved by opening the 
stables’ doors to the waves of reform than by knocking the entire edifice down’. 
 
ERT’s reopening and the lost chance to become a public service institution 
ERT was eventually reopened in July 2015 by the SYRIZA-ANEL coalition government that 
had taken office a few months earlier. Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras made its re-opening a priority as 
part of efforts to roll back cuts demanded by the lenders and called it ‘a great victory for democracy’. 
 
The ‘new’ ERT consists of: 
• Two nation-wide channels (ERT1, ERT2) based in Athens and a regional channel (ERT 3) 
based in Thessaloniki; ERT Sports HD; an intentional satellite channel, ERT World and 
two web channels (ERTPlay1, ERTPlay2). 
• Hellenic Radio (ERA) with five national radio programmes, (First, Second, Kosmos, Third, 
ERA/Sport) and an international sixth programme the ‘Voice of Greece’ which targets 
Greeks abroad, 19 regional programmes, as well as Webradio. 
• It publishes the free weekly TV/radio ERT listings magazine Radioteleorasis and has a 
strong presence on the web (www.ert.gr) and Musical ensembles.   
In financial terms, 80 per cent of ERT’s funds derive from the license fee (which is paid by all 
Greek households through the electricity bill), while 20 per cent come from commercial means, chiefly 
advertising. ERT has a relatively healthy income, compared to that of the commercial channels, despite 
the fact that the monthly licence fee is one of the lowest in Europe (reduced to about 3 Euro per 
household in 2013 due to the ongoing economic crisis). In 2018, ERT had a revenue of €199.5 million, 
with €180 coming from the license fee, whereas the rest originating from advertising, sales and 
sponsorship. Lack of resources obviously does not allow for a strong indigenous production and quality 
programming, something that would have apparently improved ERT’s reputation. At the same time the 
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SYRIZA-ANEL coalition government continues illegally, if we take into consideration the Amsterdam 
Protocol, as its predecessors did, to collect €40 million of ERT’s income per year to subsidise electric 
power! ERT’s revenues are squished by the governmental action, but ERT still has a revenue of about 
€160 million, when the advertising market for the revenues of private channels is no more than €250 
million (Kathimerini, 2018). In other words, ERT, financially, is in better shape compared to its private 
competitors. 
However, after three years of ERT’s relaunch, its audience ratings remain low (approximately 
10 per cent of the television market share for the three channels combined). The ‘new’ ERT employs 
2,307 staff including 600 journalists, at a cost of about €30 million a year. Most of them (2,114) have 
been employed on the basis of their previous job in ‘old’ ERT.  According to ‘new’ ERT structure, the 
broadcaster consists of six Directorates (Divisions), and is run by the Chairman and the Managing 
Director as well as the Board of Directors (seven members). The Divisions cover News and Current 
Affairs, Content, ERT 3, New media and Technology as well as the Administration and Financing. 
Additionally, ERT’s organisation chart includes 3 special Divisions (Corporate Communication, 
Archives and Music) as well as ERT’s Law Office. The Chairman, the Managing Director and 3 
members of the Board of Directors are nominated by the Minister of Digital Policy Telecommunication 
and the Media who is responsible for the public media as it is foreseen by law 4324/2015, article 9 
(formerly the Ministers of Finance and the State) and they are appointed by the Parliament’s Ethics and 
Transparency Committee. In effect, all members of the Board of Governors are appointed (and 
approved) by the above mentioned Committee. Needless to say, the government has the majority of this 
Committee since it echoes the power of the political parties in Parliament. Even in disputed cases, as in 
the recent 2018 case of the appointment of a member of the Board, where she was also a communication 
advisor of the leader of the ANEL party, the Parliamentary Committee appointed her with an 11 in favor 
against 3 votes. The Directors of the Divisions, especially of the News and Current Affair, are appointed 
by the ERT’s Governing Board, but in practice in accordance to the responsible Minister. As journalist 
and chief editor of daily Kathimerini Papachelas (2018) has commented: 
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“from public transport to public broadcaster ERT, it is obvious that the only criteria in 
management are: a) if the managers are ‘our people’ and b) how many we can appoint. Nothing 
more, nothing less’”. 
 
Thus, the ‘interlinkage’ between the government and the broadcaster remained as all key radio 
and television appointees were once again politically sympathetic of or affiliated to the SYRIZA-led 
coalition government. It is not then a coincidence that within the three years of new ERT’s operation 
there have been various criticisms that the SYRIZA-ANEL government continues the tight control over 
the Hellenic Broadcasting Corporation as its predecessors. Sheehan (2016: 118) notes:  
 
‘in government, instead of affirming and building on what this popular struggle had achieved, 
(SYRIZA) disregarded the popular demand for a new model of public broadcasting, based on 
critical and creative programming and worker’s self-management. Instead, they reinstated the 
old order and hierarchical management. (ERT) became government broadcasting, as it had been 
previously, expect that SYRIZA was now the government whose line was privileged’. 
 
This echoes SYRIZA’s parliamentary spokesman Nikos Xydakis who in a panel on ‘Protecting the 
Fourth Estate: Democracy, Accountability and the Media’, described the situation at ERT as ‘tragic and 
third world’. His comments prompted an exchange of counter arguments between Opposition New 
Democracy and the SYRIZA press office, but also a demand for a retraction and an apology from ERT 
President Dimitris Tsaknis. In his response he said that he had been over-the-top in his statement that 
ERT has been allowed to operate like a branch of the civil service but admitted that mistakes were made 
in relaunching it (Kathimerini, 2017). In mid-April 2018, ERT’s journalists made an appeal asking for 
ERT’s independence from the government and the political world (To Vima, 2018).  
 
Discussion and conclusions 
The Greek media ecology changed dramatically after the deregulation in the 1980s that ended the public 
broadcasting monopoly. Many media outlets appeared in a small market of just 11 million people to the 
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extent that the media landscape today is characterized by an excess of supply over demand. From a 
broadcasting field of two public TV channels and four radio stations, in the late 1980s, it has become 
an overcrowded environment comprising 120 private TV channels and 920 private radio stations, all of 
them lacking an official licence to broadcast. Traditional print media and ERT faced an unprecedented 
challenge as competition increased first from powerful (unregulated) commercial analogue broadcasters 
and then digital media. To address sharp decline in sales, the main publishers, helped by a weak 
regulatory regime, moved to electronic media, thereby raising levels of media market concentration 
(Iosifidis, 2007; Leandros 2010). The interplay between political and media elites and the strong 
clientelistic relations which characterise the Greek political system are identified as the main factors 
behind the ineffective and contradictory nature of broadcasting regulatory policies. 
Greece has undergone three separate troika-led bailouts between 2010 and 2017, which led to 
significant political instability, social unrest, and deteriorating social conditions (Kovras, 2018). The 
multi-layered economic, political and social changes driven by the ongoing economic crisis pose 
continuous challenges to the political role of the media system. Current ideological and institutional 
shifts suggest the formation of an unprecedented elite political consensus in support of the neoliberal 
restructuring of Greek society. Pivotal to this development has been the shift of the SYRIZA-led 
Government away from its anti-austerity electoral platform, and its endorsement of yet another 
memorandum agreement to more austerity measures and privatisations. The extent to which alternative 
online media may be able to rejuvenate public communication remains to be seen. However, the 
implementation of austerity, as a principle means of devaluing labour power and redistributing wealth 
towards capital, depends upon the disciplining of the affected workforce and the ideological 
assimilation of opposition. Thus, the direct connection between the economics and the politics of the 
crisis suggests that law and order news remain a key media topic necessary for contesting official 
definitions (Nikolaidis, 2015). 
Furthermore, the deregulation and commercialisation of the media and the dominance of 
television in the Greek media universe for news and entertainment forced politicians and political 
parties to adopt the media logic. Greek politicians have come to realise that they are more vulnerable 
than they were in the past. Former conservative (New Democracy) Prime Minister Constantine 
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Mitsotakis once accused the ‘web of interests of media publishers’ of being the main reason that he lost 
power. Ex-chairman of the Hellenic Parliament and MP of PASOK Apostolos Kaklamanis regularly 
attacked media owners on the grounds that they were using their channels to promote their own business 
interests. Similar statements have been made by other politicians. Even PM Tsipras in his speech 
delivered in parliament on television licences in February 2016 painted a clientelist relationship 
between businessmen ‘who are maintained and financed by banks in order to support politically 
bankrupt parties’ and the two parties which have governed Greece for decades (To Vima, 2016). 
In effect, politicians seem to use on the one hand, the TV licenses as a means of pressure and 
maintain a competitive advantage in the tactical ‘war’ with the media and business entrepreneurs. On 
the other hand, political parties, especially those in power, want to maintain the control over the public 
broadcaster echoing, to some extent De Gaulle, that centralised control of the public broadcaster 
guarantees that high culture prevails while government’s enemies control printed media (Kuhn, 1995: 
123). In practice they follow, as their counterparts in some other southern European counties, the pattern 
that the ruling party has the privilege to directly control public broadcaster and its news output. Greek 
politicians want to have the upper hand on ERT since they feel vulnerable in a confrontation with the 
vested interests which at the same time own the mainstream private media.  
Although we are at the end of the so-called Metapolitefsi - the period in modern Greek history 
after the fall of the military junta (1967-74) - and Greece has entered the age of the social media, the 
‘old’ political behaviour remains strong. In practice, Greek politicians behave like living in an analogue 
rather than the digital era. It could be argued that it is not a coincidence that television licenses have not 
been granted for almost three decades. Meanwhile, the awarding of the licenses seems to have been 
used as a part of the domestic political game. The reason of this non-policy is simple. Successive 
governments since TV deregulation in 1989 appear to have been playing an ‘on and off’ game with 
television owners who also have other interests in the Greek economy, particularly in the construction 
sector and shipping. For instance, during a conservative government administration (1990–93), 
announcements of license awards usually followed political disputes, especially with radio stations. 
When the late Andreas Papandreou came to power after the 1993 general elections, his socialist 
government announced that it would re-examine the whole regulatory environment including licenses. 
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But up to his departure in 1996, no official government license was granted. His successor, the socialist 
Simitis government announced in the Spring of 1997 the allocation of frequencies for the Greek 
television domain. According to its action-plan, the so-called ‘order in the airwaves’, the government 
would award new licenses and require a re-evaluation of the existing ones, but nothing happened. 
Inaction was also evident by its successor, the conservative Karamanlis government, despite then Prime 
Minister Costas Karamanlis calling the owners of the mainstream media ‘the pimps of the Greek media 
system’ and announcing the setting up of a ‘digital map’ (Papathanassopoulos, 2017). The over-
extended state, meanwhile, is considered by the private interests as a better place to create business (for 
example, public works), than the market, which has remained underdeveloped. It is in this context that 
one can understand why the power of private media has increased considerably, whereas the power of 
both journalists and ERT remains weak (Iosifidis and Boucas, 2015; Iosifidis, 2017). 
The ongoing financial crisis and recession has affected the media sector as a whole and turned 
some media outlets financially unsustainable. However, the most dramatic development occurred in 
2013 with the sudden closure of ERT. The shutting down of ERT and subsequent redundancy of its 
employees was seen by many as part of the latest public spending cuts imposed to meet the terms of the 
country’s bailout deal. In effect, this has left the commercially dominated Greek broadcasting landscape 
without a public channel and people dependent on the private media sector for the provision of 
information, entertainment and education. One can rightly accuse ERT of lacking clear public interest 
objectives, overstaffing, bureaucracy, wastefulness and over-rewards for senior management, but its 
abrupt closure without consultation and a strategic plan is an attack on free speech and public space by 
the Greek government. ERT required restructuring, but not closing down. Public service broadcasters 
play a crucial role in producing and disseminating public service output that brings citizens together 
and enhances the educational and cultural aspect. It is not acceptable to close down a PSB without 
consultation and to dismiss its employees, just to justify the wishes of the ‘troika’ for redundancies in 
the public sector. The closure of ERT was an attack on free speech and public space by the Greek 
government (Iosifidis and Katsirea 2014). ERT’s role is important especially today given the growth in 
social tension and the rise of the far right in Greece (Golden Dawn). Worse, it is a dangerous precedent 
to close down PSB entirely or even to link PSB reform to austerity. Greece is not the only country 
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undergoing austerity measures and looking to cut public spending, and while some slimming of budgets 
is unavoidable, we need to consider carefully the position of PSB in these conditions and prevent such 
arbitrary axing becoming a trend. 
This article argued that public service broadcasting never really existed in Greece. ERT has 
been unable to function according to the public service obligations observed in public broadcasters in 
Britain, Scandinavia or other northern European countries. Greece, like some other southern European 
countries, entered rather late into ‘modernity’ and has neither a strong civil society nor a strong market. 
The Greek media have been used as vehicles for negotiating with and pressuring the government of the 
day, rather than reflecting public discourse. Progress remains to be done regarding ERT’s staffing and 
management. All political parties which came to power had grandiose plans for the broadcaster that 
were ‘over nightly’ abandoned in the first day of their administration. The old governmental ‘behaviour’ 
is on again, while ERT’s output is neither innovative nor attractive. Provision of additional resources 
for the institution should be considered to enable ERT to principally invest in Greek production and 
investigative journalism, thus fulfilling its public service remit. In the last three years after its re-opening 
ERT has taken some initiatives for investing in Greek productions (which is in bad shape due to the 
financial crisis) and very few in investing in journalism (apart from re-employing journalists, which 
was motivated by political criteria). Above all, there should be a fresh commitment of political elites to 
enhance the accountability of new ERT in order to function as a PSB.  
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ERT 1: Until ERT’s closure in 2013 was known as ET1. Since 2015 as ERT1 
ERT 2: in 1997 was formed to NET. Formerly was known as ET-2. Since 2015 as ERT2 
1997: after the restructure of ERT 
2013: until ERT’s closure 
2014: As NERIT with N1 and Nsports from summer 2014       
2015: for the period 15/6-30/12/2017 –the period of ERT’s reopening  
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2017: data up to 29/10/2017 
 
Source:  Authors’ analysis based on data from AGB Hellas Media Research 
